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PARTICULAR AMENABILITY TO PROBATION AND
THE TROG FACTORS: REWARDING WEALTH AND
SUBSERVIENCE IN MINNESOTA CRIMINAL
SENTENCING
SEAN CAHILL*
ABSTRACT
“Particular amenability to probation” and the use of the Trog factors
should be significantly reformed and restricted as grounds for allowing a
defendant to avoid prison in criminal sentencing.1 In practice, “particular
amenability to probation” is a backdoor for courts and prosecutors to consider
otherwise impermissible factors, such as: socio-economic status, privilege,
wealth, education, cultural beliefs, and political beliefs. As a result,
defendants who have access to wealth, privilege, and prior social success are
more likely to avoid prison under the law as it stands.
To be clear, this is not an exploration of implicit bias at work in the
field of criminal sentencing. To the contrary, this article explores problematic
fragments of the law itself that explicitly allows judges and prosecutors to
make sentencing decisions favoring wealth, privilege, and social status.2
Worse yet, the law under consideration grants practitioners the inverse power
to more severely punish defendants based on cultural, philosophical, and
socio-economic factors under the aegis of the law. A judge or lawyer
exercising their discretion based on these factors can arguably do so in “good
faith.” The license granted by the law to use these factors is inherently
problematic and merits reconsideration.

*

Sean Cahill is a Senior Assistant County Attorney in Hennepin County,
Minnesota and teaches at Mitchell Hamline School of Law and the University of
St. Thomas School of Law.
1
Trog factors are named for the leading case in Minnesota, State v. Trog, 323
N.W. 2d 28 (Minn. 1982), which recognized a common law right for a court to
depart from the Sentencing Guidelines and listed several factors to inform such a
departure.
2
The exclusion of defense attorneys is purposeful because of their duty to
pursue their client’s best interest. Where judges and prosecutors should be wary in
the application of the law presented, defense attorneys face different obligations.
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This article focuses on Minnesota law as means of illustration.
Particularly, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Trog
established a common law authority that—particularly in light of recent
events—should be set aside. Particular amenability to probation and the Trog
factors permit courts to make sentencing determinations on otherwise
impermissible factors, such as socio-economic status. The courts should
abandon use of these factors in the interest of fairness and consistency.

I.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF “PARTICULAR AMENABILITY TO
PROBATION”

Minnesota criminal sentencing is governed by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines.3 Through the Guidelines are advisory, if a sentencing
court fails to identify and articulate “substantial and compelling
circumstances” supporting a departure from the guidelines, the sentence is
illegal and subject to reversal.4 The Guidelines recognize two types of
departure: durational and dispositional. A durational departure is a sentence
that carries either a lengthier sentence (upward or aggravated departure) or
shorter sentence (downward or mitigated departure).5 “A dispositional
departure places the offender in a different setting than that called for by the
presumptive guidelines sentence."6 Most often, the court either sends a
defendant to prison despite a presumptive stayed sentence (aggravated) or
pronounces a stayed sentence despite a presumptive prison term (mitigated).7
These types of departures are separate and distinct decisions by a court,
requiring separate and individual bases for each departure. “Offense-related”
factors may support either a durational or dispositional departure, but
“offender-related” factors relate only to dispositional departures.8
Since their inception, the Guidelines explicitly barred certain facts
from being considered in any departure. In the first set of guidelines, the
Commission barred race, sex, employment factors, social factors (like
education, marital status, length and circumstances of residence), and the
3

MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. (MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES
COMM’N 2019).
4
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03, subd. 4(C); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND
COMMENT. § 2.D.1.c (2019); MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subd. 2.; Williams v. State,
361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985).
5
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 1.B.5.b.(2019).
6
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
7
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 1.B.5.a. (2019).
8
State v. Behl, 573 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Walker,
913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
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exercise of constitutional rights from being used as factors to support a
departure.9 Those factors remain unchanged in 2019.10
However, for any factors that may be present, those circumstances
must be “substantial and compelling.”11 Substantial and compelling
circumstances are “those circumstances that make the facts of a particular
case different from a typical case,” or “atypical.”12 Their existence is a
threshold issue for departure.13 The Guidelines provide a non-exclusive list
of aggravating and mitigating factors that can constitute substantial and
compelling circumstances that may justify a departure.14 In terms of a
downward departure, the Guidelines recognize factors like: victim was an
aggressor; passive role, coercion, or duress; lacking substantial capacity for
judgment due to physical or mental impairment other than intoxication;
alternative placement for a defendant with serious and persistent mental
illness; and reasonable evidence a chemically dependent offender can and
will respond to a treatment program.15 However, second to last on the list is
the subject of inquiry. Under Section 2.D.3.a(7), the Guidelines state that
downward departure may be merited if:
The offender is particularly amenable to probation. This factor may,
but need not, be supported by the fact that the offender is particularly
amenable to a relevant program of individualized treatment in a
probationary setting.16
Arguably, the language “particularly amenable to probation” is the
broadest—and arguably ambiguous—factor on the list. It also happens to be
a fairly recent addition.

9

MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.1 (MINN. SENT’G
GUIDELINES COMM’N 1980).
10
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (2019).
11
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D. (1980); MINN. SENT’G
GUIDELINES § 2.D.1 (2019).
12
State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985); Walker, 913 N.W.2d at
468.
13
State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
14
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.3.a (2019).
15
Id.
16
Id. at § 2.D.3.a(7) (2019).
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The “particularly amenable” factor was added in August 2015.17 The
original 1980 list contained four mitigation factors, which included: victim
was an aggressor; minor or passive role or committed under coercion or
duress; lack of substantial capacity due to mental or physical impairment;
and any other substantial grounds not amounting to a defense.18 Two other
factors were added prior to 2015. In August 1989, the Commission added a
technical factor noting a departure is merited if prior convictions were
sentenced in either less than three or in one hearings, depending on their
severity.19 In August 2003, the Commission added a sixth factor regarding
alternative placements for serious and persistent mental illness20 Being only
the third addition in 35 years to the mitigating factors list, the August 2015
amendment suggests the Commission was responding to some new
impetus.21
More accurately, the impetus was the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
application of Trog and its progeny in a remarkable split decision, State v.
Soto.22 Where Trog broadened a court’s basis for dispositional departure by
recognizing several factors which a court may consider, Soto set a boundary
on the application of those factors. However, in doing so, the Minnesota
Supreme Court— almost unnoticeably— revived a more difficult and
troubling truth about Minnesota sentencing under the Trog factors.

A. State v. Trog
State v. Trog is a remarkably concise opinion.23 The issue was
straightforward: did the district court err by staying a defendant’s presumed
prison sentence?24 Handed down on August 17, 1982, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, not only found the district court did not err,
but it endorsed the factors used by the district court to arrive at its sentence.25

17

ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D
(MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N 2015).
18
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (1980).
19
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (1989).
20
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (2003).
21
That impetus was State v. Trog and its progeny. 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn.
1982) (en banc).
22
855 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2014).
23
Trog, 323 N.W.2d (Covering just over three pages, including headnotes).
24
Id. at 29.
25
Id. at 29. The en banc notation merits notice. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals would be founded over a year later in November 1983. As both the court
of highest authority and an error-correcting court at the time, the Minnesota
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The defendant Rick Trog was a “young man,” though the Court
never notes his actual age.26 The State of Minnesota charged Mr. Trog with
several offenses that occurred during a single behavioral incident.27 Mr. Trog
pleaded guilty to one count of “burglary with assault” in exchange for all
other charges being dropped. 28
At sentencing, Mr. Trog presented a compelling case. The Court
summarized the presentence report as stating:
[D]efendant apparently has been an “outstanding citizen.”
He had no prior involvement with the police, even as a
juvenile, had done well in school and had an excellent work
record. The report also showed that defendant, who had been
intoxicated at the time of the incident, had cooperated with
police and had been shaken by the incident and was
extremely contrite.29
The Court further noted several witnesses gave statements on defendant’s
behalf and quoted supportive testimony by the defendant’s father and a St.
Paul police officer, who had known the defendant since Mr. Trog’s
childhood.30 The Court highlighted:
. . .[D]efendant's attorney, pointing to defendant's prior
record of law-abiding behavior, his remorse, his cooperation
and his respectful attitude, the strong support shown him by
family and friends and the fact that a stayed sentence would
keep defendant under continuing supervision over a longer
period, made a strong plea for probation.31
Obviously, this is one of those opinions the reader can see the outcome
coming before making it to the end of the fact section. But the surprise does
not come with the Court’s outcome, but in what it endorses in getting there.
Supreme Court’s decision to decide the matter en banc demonstrates the Court
purposefully made a new statement of substantive law here.
26
Id. at 30.
27
Id. at 29.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 30.
31
Id.
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The Trog court began its legal analysis by recognizing its own recent
precedent, State v. Wright, regarding downward dispositional departures. “. .
. [J]ust as a defendant's particular unamenability to probation will justify
departure in the form of an execution of a presumptively stayed sentence, a
defendant's particular amenability to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of execution
of a presumptively executed sentence.”32 In Wright, unlike Trog, the Court
affirmed a trial court departure from a prison sentence based almost
exclusively on the question of the appropriate treatment setting. In Wright,
the trial court’s basis for a dispositional departure was:
. . .the opinion of the psychiatrist and the [probation] agent
who prepared the presentence investigation report, [who]
concluded that there was a strong reason for believing that
defendant would be victimized in prison and that both
defendant and society would be better off if defendant were
sent to the workhouse for a short time, then given treatment,
and then supervised on probation for the remainder of the 20
years.33
The Court affirmed the sentence and downward dispositional departure.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court acknowledged that none of the Sentencing
Guidelines’ listed mitigating factors (then-year-old) were present.34 The
Court justified its decision because the Guidelines factors were nonexclusive.35 In short, State v. Wright established a common-law mitigating
sentencing factor: particular amenability to probation by showing
amenability to individualized treatment.
The Trog court dramatically expanded Wright’s narrow
common-law mitigation factor and did so in a jarringly perfunctory
manner. Trog held:
Numerous factors, including the defendant's age, his prior
record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in
court, and the support of friends and/or family, are relevant

32

Id. at 31 (citing State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1981)).
Wright, 310 N.W.2d at 462–63.
34
Id. at 462.
35
Id.
33
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to a determination whether a defendant is particularly
suitable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.
All these factors were present in this case and justify the
dispositional departure.
The only issue in this case is whether the dispositional
departure was justified. Believing that it was justified, we
affirm.36
In two sentences, the Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed an entire new list
of facts that could be used to support the common-law mitigating factor of
amenability to probation. A list of facts and a mitigating factor that would
not be recognized by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission for
another twenty-three years. In practice, these facts have been collectively
referred to as the “Trog factors.” Trog also severed the common-law
mitigation factors that a district court can consider from the concept of
amenability to individualized treatment; that is the Court saw the Trog
factors as an additional basis for finding particular amenability to probation.37
As will be explored later but worth mentioning here, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s endorsement of the Trog factors injected socio-economic factors
(explicitly rejected by the Guidelines Commission) into the court’s
sentencing analysis. While the Trog factors may appear to be a reasonable
expansion allowing consideration of the “whole person,”38 this more
expansive approach also served as a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

B. State v. King
The following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a
practical tension between the Trog factors and the impermissible use of social
or financial factors to support a dispositional departure in State v. King.39
Like Trog, King is a terse opinion. The Court addressed a challenge to a
district court’s downward dispositional departure for a defendant who had

36

State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31.
See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006); State v. King, 337
N.W.2d 674, 675-76 (Minn. 1983).
38
See State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983) (“However,
when justifying only a dispositional departure, the trial court can focus more on the
defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best
for him and for society.”).
39
337 N.W.2d 674 (Minn. 1983).
37
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been convicted of aggravated robbery but had no other criminal history.40
The presumed sentence was a year and a day in prison.41
Instead, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a stay of execution
for a period of ten years, spend ten months in jail, pay restitution, and
participate in a treatment program.42 The motivation of the defendant to take
an arguably harsher sentence over an execution of sentence was his desire to
maintain his employment on release, help pay bills, and keep his family
together.43 On review, the Supreme Court held:
While it is true that social and financial factors may not be
directly considered as reasons for departure, occasionally
they bear indirectly on a determination such as whether a
defendant is particularly suitable to treatment in a
probationary setting. That is the case here.44
The Court affirmed the departure.45
An apologist could claim the King rule is just grounded in reality. A
person’s access to treatment or programming is impacted by social and
economic status. Wealth means you have your pick of treatment facilities;
poverty means you’re stuck with whatever the government approves for
funding through your chemical health assessment. Or, in the case of King,
working and keeping your family together is a motivation to be successful in
treatment. A cynic could claim the King rule is simply a backdoor for the
court to make judgments based on factors that society has recognized have a
potentially discriminatory effect. For example, why should socio-economic
factors matter? Place of birth, family, and familial wealth are all factors a
defendant cannot choose. Admittedly, the concern of this article is, “What if
the cynic is right—even if only in one case?”

C. State v. Soto
On October 22, 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court brought the
Trog factors to the forefront in a split decision, State v. Soto.46 Writing for
40

Id.
Id. at 675.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 675-6.
45
State v. King, 337 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn. 1983).
46
855 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2014).
41
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the majority, Justice Lillehaug noted the case was one of those “rare cases”
where the district court is found to have abused its discretion at sentencing.47
Specifically, the majority found that the district court had correctly identified
facts meeting the Trog factors, but held: “a few of the factors that we have
recognized as potentially relevant might suggest that Soto could be amenable
to probation. But those factors, individually and collectively, provide very
little support for the further conclusion that Soto had any particular
amenability to probation relative to other defendants” (emphasis in the
original).48 Combined with a finding that the district court had not
demonstrated that amenability to outpatient treatment rose to the level of
particular amenability, the Soto court’s focus on the term “particular”
emphasizes the boundary it was now articulating. In its review of the Trog
factors in the case, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a new boundary in
applying those factors. The mere possibility of success in treatment is not
sufficient to depart, but more a showing of certainty or likelihood.
The facts of Soto were particularly chilling. Jose Soto had been
convicted of first degree criminal sexual assault.49 Mr. Soto and another had
been charged with holding down a victim and taking turns to penetrate her
anally.50 Mr. Soto then told the other man to leave and proceeded to orally
and vaginally rape his victim for two hours, while choking, slapping, and
physically injuring her.51 Mr. Soto chose to plead guilty rather than face trial.
In exchange for the State dropping its pursuit of an aggravated
sentence, Mr. Soto offered a plea of guilt falling somewhere between an
Alford plea and a Norgaard plea, claiming insufficient memory due to his
intoxication during the incident.52 There was no agreement as to the sentence.
At the sentencing, the court received a presentence investigation report
recommending prison, but it also noted that Mr. Soto “appears to be an
appropriate candidate for participation in the outpatient Sexual Abuse
Treatment program.”53 The report also provided an excerpt of the defendant’s
version of the incident, stating:

47

Id. at 305.
Id. at 310-12.
49
Id. at 306.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 307.
48
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I had consensual sex with a female who was cheating on her
boyfriend and to get out of it she said I raped her! I am not a
violent person and do feel as [if] the woman I had sex with
is a liar and a coward and I do not deserve to be in jail for
something I didn't do!54
However, at the hearing, Mr. Soto apologized to his victim.55 The Minnesota
Supreme Court summarized the district court’s findings as follows:
According to the district court, the “sole reason” for
departing from the presumptive disposition was Soto's
“amenability to probation.” A significant factor in the
district court's conclusion that Soto was amenable to
probation was the statement in the Upper Mississippi Mental
Health Center's diagnostic assessment that Soto was an
“appropriate candidate” for its outpatient treatment program.
Telling Soto that he would have an opportunity to correct his
behavior, the district court emphasized that Soto was “only
37 years of age,” that he did not have many serious crimes
in his record, and that it was “primarily alcohol that night
[that] was the problem.” The district court also remarked that
Soto's attitude in court was “largely . . . respectful” and that
“this particular type of event seems largely out of character.”
Finally, the district court noted that Soto “seem[ed] to have
some family support” and that focusing on his 10-year-old
son might motivate him to correct his behavior. The district
court did not say anything about Soto's culpability in
sexually assaulting M.F. or whether putting Soto on
supervised probation would protect public safety.56
The Court then considered each of the factors in its legal analysis to
determine whether a dispositional departure was merited under the facts
presented. Importantly, most of the factors cited by the district court were
Trog factors.

54

Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
56
Id.
55
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The Court began by emphasizing that the basis for the district court’s
departure—amenability to probation—was not listed as a mitigating factor
under the Sentencing Guidelines, but again noted that the Guidelines’ factors
were “non-exclusive.”57 As a result, the Court turned to the language of its
common-law precedent in Trog and Wright.58 The majority opinion
emphasized that the standard for review is particular amenability to
probation, not merely amenability.59 It then turned to consider the mitigating
factors under two implicit prongs: (1) particular amenability to an
individualized treatment program60 and (2) particular amenability under the
Trog factors.61 Ultimately, the Court did not fault the district court for
recognizing and applying the mitigating factors in sentencing. Instead, the
Court found that the district abused its discretion because the factors only
established, at best, amenability to probation and not particular amenability.
The Court vacated the sentence and remanded for further proceedings.
In its consideration of the Trog factors, the Soto court specifically
dealt with Mr. Soto’s status as a father.62 The lower appellate court rejected
this fact as inappropriate for consideration because it was a prohibited “social
or economic factor” under the Guidelines.63 The Supreme Court rejected this
analysis, favoring its qualification under State v. King. “The courts of
appeals' holding, again, is inconsistent with our recognition that facts that
cannot themselves justify a departure can be relevant to determining whether
a defendant is particularly amenable to probation” (emphasis added).64 So
the Soto court not only revisited the use of Trog factors in sentencing, but it
also reinforced their common-law precedent that the Guidelines’ otherwise
prohibited social and economic factors could be used to support the
mitigating factor of particular amenability to probation—even though such
mitigating factor was not recognized by the Guidelines. In short, the Court
reinvigorated the apparent conflict between the Trog factors and the
explicitly prohibited factors under the Guidelines.
The Soto dissent registers a meaningful criticism regarding the
majority’s reasoning about a new threshold question. Justice Page wrote the
57

Id. at 308.
State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 309-10.
61
Id. at 310-12.
62
Id. at 312.
63
Id.
64
Id.
58
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dissent, joined by Chief Justice Gildea and Justice Anderson, and highlighted
that the trial court made no error in applying the Trog factors and considering
amenability to treatment.65 The dissent accuses the majority of simply
disagreeing over the outcome and wishing to substitute its own judgment.66
Given that the majority hinged its legal analysis on the term “particularly”
and framed the issue as a threshold question—the dissent’s criticism is
poignant. The trial court found the Trog factor evidence was good enough to
merit a departure; the Supreme Court majority simply disagreed. More
importantly, the dissent shows the entire court had no issue with the Trog
factors or how they were individually applied.
Overall, the Soto decision combined the holdings of Wright, Trog,
King, and its progeny into a single framework of analysis. A district court
can dispositionally depart from a presumed prison sentence if there are
factors showing a defendant’s particular amenability to probation. Particular
amenability could be established if a court found one of two complementary
bases: either a defendant was particularly amenable to individualized
treatment in the community or the Trog factors demonstrated substantial and
compelling reasons to depart.
In turn, the Soto decision posed four issues to the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission. One, the common-law mitigating
factor of “particular amenability to probation” remained unrecognized by
the Sentencing Guidelines, despite its obvious use at the district court level.
Two, the Court endorsed its own use of the Trog factors—also
unrecognized by the Guidelines—to support a mitigating dispositional
departure. Three, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of otherwise
impermissible factors under the Guidelines (social and economic
circumstances) to justify application of this common-law mitigation factor.
And four, the Court had now reversed a district court’s decision for
misapplying these factors. More succinctly, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had developed an entirely independent jurisprudence around its own
mitigating factor for dispositional departures—and now, a district court had
been found to abuse its discretion based on that jurisprudence. While only
advisory, the Guidelines serve a practical purpose in telling judges where
they can tread confidently in sentencing; where caution and careful
explanation is necessary; and where they should absolutely not venture. As

65
66

Id. at 315-16.
Id.
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Soto demonstrated, there was an area of sentencing where the Guidelines
simply failed to offer guidance.

II.

2015 SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENTS

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission diligently
responded to the Soto case at the first opportunity it had: the 2015
Amendments to the Guidelines. In light of Soto, the Commission added both
a new mitigating factor and a corresponding comment. It formally adopted
the “particularly amenable to probation” factor, noting that it may, but not
necessarily, include particularly amenable to “individualized treatment in a
probationary setting.”67 The corresponding comment, Section 2.D.303,
embodies three rules of law from Minnesota Supreme Court precedent.68
First, it reiterates that any reasons for departure must be substantial and
compelling. Second, it embraces the King holding, as expressed through
Soto, stating: “while social or economic factors cannot justify a departure,
such facts may be relevant to determining whether a defendant is particularly
amenable to probation.” 69 Third, the comment endorses the Trog factors as
grounds to support a departure. Neither the factor nor the comment have been
changed in subsequent amendments.
The Guidelines now match Minnesota Supreme Court precedent. By
doing so, the Guidelines Commission adopted an inherent tension posed by
the Trog factors, the King rule, and the Guidelines’ express prohibition from
considering social or economic factors. It also adopted the broad, ambiguous
nature of the Trog factors. The combination of these two issues may not be
concerning on its face. But when we see how widely “particular amenability”
is used by the courts as a basis for departure, one wonders if this basis for
departure is not so restrictive as held in Soto.

III.

PARTICULAR AMENABILITY TO PROBATION: 2016 TO 2018

From 2016 to 2018, Minnesota courts used “particularly amenable
to probation” with considerable regularity in justifying dispositional
departures. In those three years, Minnesota courts granted 6,316 dispositional
departures. Of those departures, 4,150 (just under 66%) listed “particular
amenability to probation” as a factor supporting the departure. This rate
implies two things: one, the district courts were perfectly comfortable using
67

ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY §
2.D (MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N 2015).
68
MINNESOTA SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.303 cmt. (2019).
69
See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 312.
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particular amenability as a basis for departure and had been using it well
before the Guidelines’ adoption, and two, particular amenability is a broad
and flexible concept on the ground. These implications are also supported by
the rate of downward dispositional departures in total. From 2016 to 2018,
Minnesota courts displayed a stable and consistent departure rate. In 2016,
Minnesota courts departed dispositionally in 35.9% from all presumptive
prison commit sentences.70 In 2017, 34.0%71; and in 2018, 35.8%.72 In
combination, this means over these three years approximately 22 or 23 out
of every 100 felons facing a presumptive prison commitment received a
downward dispositional departure based on “particular amenability to
probation.” A missing piece of data is how often the Trog factors are used by
the courts, leaving it unknown which Soto prong (individualized treatment or
Trog factors) a sentencing court is relying upon for its decision. Regardless,
the particular amenability to probation factor supporting downward
dispositional departures is a widely used tool by Minnesota courts.

IV.

PRACTICAL IMPACTS OF PARTICULAR AMENABILITY AND TROG
FACTORS
A. Wealth and Privilege

The problem with “particular amenability” and the Trog factors is
the myriad of ways these factors reward wealth, privilege, and
moral/philosophical “buy-in.” Though no Minnesota court would explicitly
cite to such in good conscience while sentencing, wealth and privilege
touches most of the Trog factors and amenability to probation generally.
Please pardon the anecdotal nature of the argument, but the use of broad
caricatures here will hopefully conjure up plausible archetypes that resonate
with most criminal law practitioner’s experience. Rather than individually
exploring how each amenability or Trog factor can be impacted, it is
somewhat easier to consider how aspects of wealth and privilege impact
multiple factors at the same time. It is also worthwhile to define the terms
“wealth” and “privilege” as they are used here.
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In both cases, “wealth” and “privilege” are used broadly. “Wealth”
refers to the relative abundance of a person’s financial resources that can be
tapped in times of crisis. This can mean any number of possible resources
that could be converted to cash or payment for services, high incomes, or
access to generational wealth. For example, a defendant may not have a large
amount of cash reserves to spend, but she may own property, large luxury
goods (such as a high-end car or boat), trust funds, or even a strong credit
rating. Property or goods may serve as collateral to access loans or may be
quickly liquidated for significant cash payouts. A strong credit rating will
increase the likelihood of obtaining loans, payment plans, and more favorable
borrowing terms. In turn, “privilege” refers to general socio-economic
benefits tied to greater wealth, but also to stable social and family
environments. Access to good schools, a diversity of employment options,
safe and healthy communities. . .all increase the likelihood that a person will
have greater social mobility and tools to weather a life crisis. “Privilege” may
also refer to the underlying social skills and cultural literacy. The economic
term “class” is helpful because it recognizes the social connections and
identities often associated with various strata of wealth. The compounding
effect of generational wealth cannot be understated either. For younger
offenders, the power of the Trog factors is most often unlocked not through
their own wealth, but through the wealth and privilege provided by their
family. Whether personal or familial, access to resources and the ability to
obtain significant cash funds within days, if not weeks, has practical
ramifications that increase the likelihood of demonstrating a “particular
amenability to probation.”
As a caveat, I do not suggest persons of a particular class will act or
behave in a particular manner based on their social-economic status.
However, wealth and privilege tend to correlate with other social goods:
better schools, safer neighborhoods, better healthcare, access to higher
quality foods, etc. These social goods in turn have collateral effects that
impact behavior, social customs, interpersonal communication, and social
mobility. The combination of access to resources and certain social
competencies will impact how a defendant may be able to use the Trog
factors to his or her benefit. Conversely, defendants who do not have the
same resources, social skills, or cultural competencies may find the Trog
factors of limited value.
To start, wealth has the simple benefit of increasing a defendant’s
access to treatment. Impoverished defendants seeking treatment are bound
by the limits and rules of government funding, minimal health insurance, and
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availability. In contrast, wealthy defendants are more likely to have their pick
of treatments – so long as they are willing to pay out of pocket. Greater wealth
means greater choice which means greater likelihood of accessing treatment
services. It also increases the speed with which treatment can begin. If you
can pay out of pocket, you are not stuck waiting for funding approval.
Wealth also improves the likelihood of demonstrating “amenability
to probation” by enabling defendants to avoid pretrial detention. Obviously,
greater wealth means a greater likelihood of paying any monetary pretrial
bail. So, rather than being held in a county jail pending trial, a defendant can
use that limited period of time to: establish a foothold in a treatment program,
secure employment that will not be impacted should he be convicted,
preemptively engage in therapy or anger management, demonstrate a
sustained period of sobriety, etc. A defendant in the community can establish
months of independent engagement in prosocial activities, court compliance,
treatment, and reform in the community – precisely what the judge wants to
see in a defendant on probation in the community. In contrast, a detained
defendant cannot build a record of pretrial reform in the community. Whereas
detained defendant must overcome the doubt that any progress or services
completed while incarcerated will “hold up” when the defendant returns to
the community with all its freedoms and temptations.
Not to mention, wealth can impact quality of services. An alcoholic
treatment center with perks like outdoor yoga, guided meditation, talk
therapy, and designer-coffee fueled support groups is probably a much more
enjoyable experience than a revolving-door treatment center housed in an old
urban school with off-white concrete block walls that focuses on triage and
worksheets. Wealth not only increases the choice a defendant has in
treatment but increases access to higher quality treatment programs. In turn,
a defendant’s access to premiere treatment programs turns into a selling point
to a judge under the Wright rule. Amenability to probation does not mean
you can buy your way out of prison with a ticket to a premiere treatment
center; but, those who have access to wealth are far more likely to obtain
resources necessary to pitch a successful downward departure argument
based on treatment. Again, the issue is not so much that approximately six of
every hundred defendants presumed to go to prison upon conviction receive
a departure; the issue is whether those six are consistently wealthier. Or more
bluntly, should even one out of 100 be granted a departure because private
wealth gave them access to resources to receive one?
Generational wealth and privilege also have the benefit of
inoculating a defendant or their families from complete disruption in
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moments of crisis. A defendant who has access to wealth through family has
greater ease in the day-to-day challenges of meeting treatment expectations,
and if necessary, meeting other demands like a job or family. Take
transportation for example. Say a defendant has parents who have a modest
savings and are committed to helping their child. The defendant owns a
vehicle which breaks down four weeks into treatment. Parents step in,
purchase defendant a cheap, but working vehicle to replace it. Defendant
retains all the benefits of private transportation: flexibility in schedule, faster
travel from point A to point B, and the ability to store items (like a work
uniform or food) in the car, increasing accessibility and reducing the
possibility of theft. This, in turn, makes it more likely the defendant can
maintain a job in addition to treatment, travel to necessary medical or
probation appointments at will, and run errands as needed (like picking up
medication). In contrast, consider a defendant in the same position with no
access to family wealth. Her car breaks down and she does not have the
money to replace it. Hiring Uber, Lyft, or taxis is similarly cost-prohibitive.
So, she turns to public bus transportation. Suddenly, her twenty-minute drive
to work now takes an hour bus ride (assuming the job site is accessible by
bus at all). Assuming that does not result in loss of employment due to time
constraints, that transportation time now eliminates possibility for other
tasks. This increases the risk of more issues, such as less time for grocery
shopping, less time for cooking and exercise, exposure to more diseases in
public, and exposure to the elements while waiting for transport. In turn,
these pressures may make the cost of attending treatment untenable in the
financial crisis. The crisis caused by the loss of a vehicle is only one example.
More disruptive crises, such as loss of a job, a medical crisis, loss of housing,
or subsequent arrest, could also derail success in a treatment program.
However, access to family resources help to mitigate the impact of these
crises and allow the defendant to continue focusing on pursuing treatment.
This is also why “family support” is included in the Trog factors. A
defendant’s access to family resources helps defendants manage small crises
that, managed alone, might derail a defendant’s pro-social activities. In this
way, generational wealth actually supports a defendant on multiple
“amenability to probation” factors.
The other problem is that poverty correlates with a host of social
problems that would impact multiple factors in gauging amenability to
probation. Ongoing work in sociology continues to explore how poverty is a
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multidimensional challenge that exposes people to correlated adversities.73
As one author reports: “The research indicates the ubiquity of violence,
health problems, and chaos in the childhoods, homes, schools, and
neighborhoods of the poor.”74 In one Minnesota study, University of
Minnesota legal scholar Richard Frase observed that social disadvantage,
crime, and law enforcement reinforced one another, causing a cyclical pattern
of incarceration and disadvantage that disproportionately impacted black
Minnesotans.75 Whatever might cause this correlation, an impoverished
defendant will likely face challenges on other supportive factors for
“particular amenability to probation” for treatment or under the Trog factors.
In the opposite, wealth, privilege, or intergenerational access to either
provides integral resources necessary to support amenability to probation in
the community. Sadly, this may indicate that “amenability to probation”
protects the status quo; wealth helps keep one out of prison and avoids the
economic harm of incarceration while poverty deprives one of social
advantages to establish “amenability” but deepens one’s poverty by the
economic harm caused by a prison sentence. Sufficed to say, a defendant’s
“particular amenability to probation” under the law may be more a virtue of
their wealth and privilege rather than a personal commitment to self-reform
or rehabilitation.
Correction of this problem can go in two directions. One, particular
“amenability to probation” is severely restricted to those cases that were so
directly tied to chemical use or mental health issues that a defendant’s
culpability for his conduct is significantly reduced. Or two, Minnesota courts
should drop the “particular” requirement from Soto and more expansively
permit treatment in lieu of prison. Either direction reduces the impact of
wealth in accessing and succeeding in treatment.

B. Attitude in Court and Cooperation
Another problematic Trog factor is attitude in court. Remorse has
been explicitly endorsed by the Minnesota Supreme Court under the
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amended Guidelines. “A primary justification for considering remorse in
sentencing is that a defendant's remorse bears on his or her ability to be
rehabilitated.”76 Generally, the courts have endorsed not only remorse- but
cooperation.77 The court has also found a level of defensiveness that may
interfere with treatment does not support a departure.78 Again, this seems like
a common sense rule on its face, but recent events merit reconsideration.
Endorsement of remorse and cooperation with the court (and
possibly law enforcement) arguably rewards defendants for demonstrating a
moral disposition that acknowledges wrongdoing and possible willingness to
change. Remorse, by its nature, reflects a recognition of harm caused and
acknowledgement of suffering in others. There is a sense of guilt for one’s
actions.79 This disposition lends itself to a willingness for reform. Therefore,
remorse is one of the ways a defendant can express a desire to make use of
treatment rather than prison.
Underlying remorse and cooperation, however, is an acceptance of
the court’s authority. A defendant implicitly says: “I have done wrong and
you have a right to act upon me.” Quite plainly, the courts have the power
under Trog to reward those who are going along quietly. This should give
any student of criminal law pause. It’s no secret that the American criminal
justice system has come under significant scrutiny in the last decade.
Watershed moments like Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, Ferguson
and Black Lives Matter, the deaths of numerous Black men at the hands of
police (most recently, the death of George Floyd) have taken hold in the
public’s consciousness.80 The growth of “system-critical” think tanks,
advocacy groups, and non-profits (i.e., the Innocence Project, the Bail Project
or “Freedom Fund”) have raised serious and sustained criticisms to the
United States’ criminal justice system. Not surprisingly, these criticisms have
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reached the ears of defendants who see a system at work upon them for
nefarious purposes (if they did not already).
This worldview inherently undercuts a person’s willingness to
express remorse to or cooperate with the courts. If you see your arrest and
charging as the symptom of systemic racism, disparate police practices, and
imbalanced power dynamics, you are unlikely to accept, much more submit
yourself, to the authority of the courts. Without commenting on the substance
of these criticisms, it is reasonable to expect that some defendants will
genuinely question the actions and procedures of the criminal justice system
in the process. While a court would presumably not punish a defendant for
such, the withholding of a benefit under the law still causes a detrimental
impact. To cut to the quick, if a defendant openly questions the actions of
law enforcement, state prosecution, or the court at all stages based on these
larger criticisms, would the court extend the benefit of these cooperation and
attitude Trog factors? The nature of attitude and cooperation factors are a
carrot to promote calm proceedings, nondisruptive conduct, and defendant
acquiescence. Granted, there is a range of conduct that a defendant could use
to voice their challenges, but there are bound to be more excited presentations
than others. Similar to the arguments below, this issue bears similarities to
issues around cultural competency. Should courts discourage such protests
by withholding favorable consideration under the Trog factors of cooperation
and attitude? I suggest not. Courts have considerable discretion to control a
courtroom and address problematic behaviors.81 But trying to quell protests
in the courtroom by withholding favorable consideration in sentencing is an
exercise in cultural dominance. In engaging in such behavior, a judge is now
using sentencing as means of control rather than a reflection of criminal
conduct.
I posit that the Trog factors of cooperation and attitude are overly
broad and misguided measures of amenability to probation. The thrust of
these factors is to acknowledge a cognitive or moral acceptance of guilt and
a willingness to change. But using attitude and cooperation in court wrongly
places a defendant’s relationship with the court as the measure of
commitment. Rather, the courts should look to more meaningful
demonstrations of remorse. Authentic displays of victim-centered
81
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consciousness of guilt, independent and unsolicited acts of community
service, and a demonstrated commitment to “clean living,” such as a lack of
new offenses, documented sobriety, and pro-social activities better express
genuine reform than polite behavior in court. Placing an emphasis on a
defendant’s relationship to the court also takes away focus on a victim – be
it an individual or society – and potentially discourages legitimate criticism
of the criminal justice process. And frankly, it is not much a measure of
remorse at all. In my practice, I have seen plenty of defendants try to work
the judge over with obsequious platitudes, only to turn back to their victim
and speak of them in the vilest and most degrading of terms.82 There are
simply too many intervening factors and motivations that could separate a
defendant’s courtroom conduct (or misconduct) from his remorse or lack
thereof. Therefore, the Trog factors of attitude and cooperation should be
discarded because they do little to demonstrate genuine remorse and simply
serve as an incentive to discourage courtroom disruption.
In addition, differences in cultural background and personality may
influence a judge’s perception of cooperation and attitude. Research indicates
that the perception of emotions face barriers when communicated across
cultural lines.83 Conflict and tension can increase in cross-cultural
communication.84 Modern business scholars recognize a need for cultural
intelligence and multiculturalism for better conflict management.85 Similarly,
judges may face some difficulty identifying a defendant’s emotional
expression if they are communicating across cultural lines. Therefore, a judge
and defendant may miscommunicate, even if there is a genuine attempt by a
defendant to convey cooperation or agreement. Compound those issues with
personality disorders, possible chemical addiction, and otherwise general
mistrust, a defendant’s presentation in court may not always accurately
reflect their better judgment. But these limitations do not necessarily mean a
defendant is recalcitrant or unamenable to probation either. Courtroom
interactions face all the complexity and nuance as every human relationship.
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Some are more volatile, some are more subdued, and some folks just do not
play well together. Consequently, the Trog factors of cooperation and attitude
in court are such variable, subjective factors that they should bear little
weight on judging a person’s “amenability to probation.”
Ultimately, particular amenability to probation may be a practical
and just means to appropriately address serious crimes that are a radical
exception to an otherwise law-abiding life. Additionally, those crimes may
be the culmination of tragic choices brought on by the sheer burden of
poverty, chemical dependency, and social inequality. However, the law’s
current state regarding “amenability to probation” and the Trog factors invite
consideration of factors that are unfair, otherwise prohibited, or irrelevant to
the ultimate goal. Significantly, particular amenability to probation is more
likely a product of socio-economic factors that have no relation to criminal
conduct. Similarly, most of the Trog factors are social factors that bear little
insight into a defendant’s commitment to reform. Worse yet, some of the
Trog factors may discourage legitimate and genuine expressions of protest,
discontent, or attempts at self-advocacy. Likewise, these factors may be
limited because of individual cultural or personality differences. In the big
picture, particular amenability to probation and the Trog factors introduce
too many impermissible or immeasurable factors into a sentencing judgment
to be considered consistent or fair. The use of the Trog factors should be
limited to age, prior record (or lack thereof), and concrete acts of remorse.

C. A Note on Discretion
Discretion is a double-edged sword. In one direction, it allows
practitioners to rise above the letter of the law and deliver justice in
exceptional cases -- be it leniency or greater severity. In the other direction,
it is the entry point into which an individual practitioner’s own bias (implicit
or explicit), undisclosed beliefs, or personal values can impact legal
outcomes. Regarding the Trog factors specifically, discretion also allows for
a wide variation in their application and weight. Absent individual review on
appeal, there is little anyone can do to track, quantify, or review judicial use
of the Trog factors. Consequently, there is little the public can do to review
the bench’s use of “particular amenability to probation.” We must simply
trust that Trog factors will be used appropriately and any gross misuse will
be corrected by appellate review.
However, discretion can also be the means by which the bench acts
as a collective whole. In which case, I would invite the courts and prosecutors
to consider the reflections made here and consider foregoing or severely
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restrict the use of the Trog factors and “particular amenability to probation”
as grounds for dispositional departures. This approach is supported by
common law precedent. “. . .[A] district court always has discretion to impose
a presumptive prison sentence even if the Trog factors support a probationary
sentence.”86 If the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and the Minnesota
Supreme Court are unwilling to revisit particular “amenability to probation”
and the Trog factors, the district court has the means to act on their own
accord. And for the criticisms raised above, I ask district court judges to
consider them in their own sentencing decisions going forward.

D. Why Take Away a Tool?
Advocates seeking to reduce the use of incarceration as a means of
punishment will rightfully point out that elimination of these factors take
away legal tools that allow a court to find non-prison consequences for
defendants. This is true. But the criticism here is not to suggest that more
people should be in prison. It is a question of whether particular “amenability
to probation” provides a wider backdoor for some to avoid prison, while
others find that door narrowed by socio-economic factors outside their
control. Whether the bar to go to prison is raised or lowered, the concern here
is how the courts determine exceptions to that bar, no matter where it falls.
If there are fewer means of avoiding prison based on socio-economic factors,
outcomes will be more consistent and equitable. By tying a prison sentence
more directly to conduct (rather than wealth, privilege, family, or politeness),
efforts to reduce incarceration for certain crimes will also be applied more
equitably (and arguably have greater impact). So, while the elimination of
sentencing factors may impact rates of departure, they do not take away from
prison-reduction advocates’ greater criticisms regarding incarceration.

CONCLUSION
In the end, I offer that the particular “amenability to probation” factor
and Trog factors should be revisited and severely restricted or limited. It
opens the door to socio-economic factors that fall outside of a defendant’s
control and could create patently unfair results. Whether through Guidelines’
amendment, common-law reconsideration, or a grassroots reformed practice
by the district court bench, equal and fair treatment under Minnesota
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sentencing law would be well-served by rewriting particular amenability to
probation and the Trog factors.

